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3Executive	summary	
A courageous and ambitious New Pact on Migration 
and Asylum is one that strengthens the right to asylum; 
sets the conditions for more equal relationships with 
third countries when it comes to managing migration; 
and puts forward a mechanism that can foster genuine 
solidarity between member states.
When	the	new	Commission	entered	into	office	in	
December 2019, it promised a fresh start on migration. 
President	Ursula	von	der	Leyen	pledged	to	deliver	a	
‘New Pact’ which would break the deadlock between 
member states on long-awaited reforms, striking a more 
equitable balance between solidarity and responsibility.
Unfortunately, based on a range of leaked papers and 
official	(draft)	documents	that	have	been	circulating	
since late 2019, it seems that the Commission may opt 
to reduce the New Pact to a collection of watered-down 
compromises on responsibility-sharing. It also appears 
to be doubling down on control-oriented measures. 
A different approach is needed to set 
up an EU asylum and migration policy 
that is efficient, respects asylum seekers’ 
fundamental rights and can prevent and 
address future humanitarian emergencies.  
This Discussion Paper argues that a different approach 
is needed to set up an EU asylum and migration policy 
that	is	efficient,	respects	asylum	seekers’	fundamental	
rights	and	can	prevent	and	meaningfully	address	
future	humanitarian	emergencies.	It	examines	the	
persistent	divisions	among	European	countries	that	
the	Commission	must	overcome	and	provides	concrete	
recommendations	on	how	it	can	advance	an	ambitious	
agenda	that	is	fit	for	these	uncertain	times,	particularly	
on responsibility-sharing, asylum procedures, and the 
external	dimension	of	migration	policies:	
q  Firstly, this Discussion Paper calls on the European 
Commission to put forward a mechanism for 
meaningful solidarity between member states. To 
prevent	humanitarian	emergencies,	this	mechanism	
must ensure the prompt relocation of all those in 
need	from	countries	of	first	arrival.	Although	a	degree	
of	flexibility	in	solidarity	contributions	may	help	to	
forge consensus, the Commission should ensure that 
individual	contributions	are	systematic,	needs-based	
and implemented in practice. 
q  Secondly, the New Pact should prioritise 
strengthening the right to asylum. Procedural 
safeguards	should	be	reinforced,	and	financial	
resources	and	operational	support	should	be	invested	
in	the	regular	asylum	process	to	improve	the	
efficiency	of	the	Common	European	Asylum	System.	
The border instrument currently under discussion 
may	fail	to	improve	the	efficiency	of	asylum	
processes, and put asylum seekers unnecessarily  
at risk.
q  Thirdly	and	finally,	the	New	Pact	should	promote	
a more holistic and sustainable relationship with 
third countries. This means minimising the use of 
conditionality,	preventing	return	and	readmission	
from dominating the agenda, increasing and 
implementing resettlement commitments, and 
promoting	the	development	of	legal	pathways.
The COVID-19 outbreak has already forced the 
Commission to postpone the publication of the New 
Pact on Migration and Asylum. At the same time, 
tensions	on	the	EU’s	external	borders,	together	with	
member states’ go-at-it-alone approaches to the 
coronavirus,	have	further	exposed	long-standing	
structural weaknesses in European asylum and 
migration systems. The question of whether or not the 
New	Pact	can	deliver	a	migration	and	asylum	policy	that	
is	acceptable	to	member	states	and,	at	the	same	time,	fit	
for the challenges the EU is currently facing is now all 
the more pressing.
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When	the	von	der	Leyen	Commission	took	office	in	
December	2019,	it	voiced	a	strong	ambition	to	reshape	
European migration policy through a New Pact on 
Migration and Asylum.1 The European Commission’s 
goal	is	to	forge	a	new	consensus	after	conflicting	
positions between member states and among EU 
institutions blocked the reform of the Common 
European	Asylum	System	(CEAS)	for	the	past	four	years.
The planned publication of the Pact has been postponed 
due	to	the	COVID-19	pandemic.	However,	as	discussions	
progressed,	it	has	become	clear	that	divisions	persist	
on	several	files,	including	most	notably	the	reform	of	
the Dublin system. By contrast, increasing the number 
of	returns	and	strengthening	external	borders	remain	
a shared priority for most member states and are high 
in the Commission’s agenda. This has raised concerns 
that the Pact will focus on lowest-common-denominator 
compromises, and that consensus may come at the cost 
of an ambitious and humane migration and asylum policy. 
Consensus may come at the cost of an 
ambitious and humane migration and 
asylum policy. 
Meanwhile, continuous tensions at the border between 
Greece and Turkey and the outbreak of COVID-19 in 
Europe in March 2020 put further pressure on the 
Commission	to	come	up	with	effective	EU	responses	in	
the area of migration management. Both emergencies 
have	exacerbated	shortcomings	of	the	Union’s	asylum	
system	that	have	not	been	systematically	addressed	in	the	
past. The unsustainable situation in the Greek islands is a 
case	in	point.	Long-term	thinking	and	ambitious	reforms	
are necessary if the EU is to rise to the test. 
The	Commission	should	deliver	a	New	Pact	that	is	fit	
for these uncertain times. Firstly, it should include a 
mechanism for meaningful solidarity between member 
states	to	enable	effective	relocations	and	prevent	
humanitarian emergencies in the future. Secondly, 
the Commission should use the New Pact to reinforce 
the right to asylum while minimising detention. 
Finally,	the	EU’s	external	migration	policy	must	be	
recalibrated to reduce the emphasis on returns and 
border management. The Commission should take a 
more holistic approach and strengthen resettlement and 
other legal pathways. Otherwise, the EU may harm its 
relations with third countries.
This Discussion Paper begins by outlining the state 
of play from December 2019 onwards, when the 
Commission	started	developing	its	approach	to	the	New	
Pact. The Paper highlights the challenges in meeting 
the	Commission’s	objective	of	building	consensus	
between member states. In the second part, the Paper 
lays out the compromises the Commission appeared 
set to adopt in hopes of securing the greatest possible 
support for the New Pact. Finally, this Paper calls on 
both the Commission and member states to learn the 
lessons	from	the	most	recent	developments	at	the	
Greece-Turkey border and the COVID-19 pandemic. As 
these	crises	have	shown,	the	EU	needs	a	more	ambitious	
migration and asylum agenda.
1.  State of play: The New Pact, interrupted
Since	the	new	European	Commission	took	office	in	
December, Vice-President Margaritis Schinas and 
Commissioner	for	Home	Affairs	Ylva	Johansson	have	
toured	European	capitals	to	discuss	and	overcome	
member	states’	conflicting	positions	on	EU	migration	
policy.	This	consensus-building	exercise	is	no	easy	task:	
a series of leaked position papers from the past months 
indicate that important disagreements between member 
states are ongoing.2
The turning point for the Commission’s cautious 
consensus-building occurred in March 2020. Tensions 
at the border between Greece and Turkey, coupled with 
the	outbreak	of	the	pandemic	across	Europe,	have	risen,	
rightly,	to	the	top	of	the	Commission’s	agenda.	However,	
they also showcase the need for profound changes to the 
current migration and asylum policy.
On	27	February,	President	Recep	Tayyip	Erdoğan	stated	
that Turkey would start letting migrants enter the EU 
unhindered, thus breaching the EU-Turkey Statement. 
In	the	following	days,	over	13,000	people	arrived	at	the	
border	with	Greece,	although	the	vast	majority	were	
prevented	from	entering.	Greece	responded	by	closing	
its borders with strong operational and political support 
from the EU. It also suspended the right to asylum, for 
one month3	–	a	violation	of	international	law	that	EU	
officials	were	reluctant	to	condemn.4
By April, almost all migrants had left the border area, 
Turkey	had	reversed	its	course	as	diplomatic	discussions	
resumed, and the EU had launched further efforts to 
aid the relocation of unaccompanied minors from 
Greece.	However,	the	developments	in	early	March	
raised concerns about the EU’s willingness to tolerate 
5human	rights	violations	in	the	name	of	effective	border	
management, and about the future of cooperation with 
Turkey and third countries more generally. 
The present challenges point to structural 
weaknesses in the EU’s migration and 
asylum policies that must be addressed as 
a matter of urgency. 
Meanwhile,	in	March,	the	coronavirus	pandemic	
accelerated in Europe. Following the outbreak of  
COVID-19	in	Europe,	17	Schengen	countries	have	
reintroduced internal border checks and imposed strict 
restrictions	on	free	movement.5	The	external	borders	
of the EU were also closed, with many third countries 
around the world following suit.6 These measures are 
having	a	spillover	effect	on	European	migration	and	
asylum	policy.	Planned	relocations	from	overcrowded	
and	makeshift	camps	that	lack	medical	facilities	have	
become	even	more	urgent,	yet	face	further	delays.7 
Several	member	states	have	suspended	their	asylum	
processes and closed their ports to migrants rescued at 
sea.8	Returns	from	Europe	have	been	all	but	suspended.	
Global	resettlements	of	vulnerable	refugees	are	coming	
to a halt, as are opportunities to reach the EU safely.9
The impact of both crises on the New Pact will be 
substantial. Content-wise, discussions on the future 
of the Schengen Borders Code, responsibility-sharing 
over	asylum	seekers	and	external	border	management	
have	been	burst	wide	open.	The	Pact’s	publication	may	
also	have	to	wait	some	time,	as	the	political	energy	is	
currently	focused	elsewhere.	Nevertheless,	the	present	
challenges point to structural weaknesses in the EU’s 
migration and asylum policies that must be addressed 
as a matter of urgency. As such, it is useful to take stock 
of where the Commission and the New Pact stood before 
these two crises broke out, and what the Commission’s 
starting position is likely to be as it responds to these 
new challenges.
2.	 	Before	the	Pact:	Where	consensus	can(not)	 
be found
Before March 2020, talks on the New Pact were 
primarily focused on three elements of the European 
Commission’s	future	agenda:	(i)	the	Dublin	system;	
(ii)	border	procedures;	and	(iii)	cooperation	with	third	
countries on migration management.  
Most countries agree that the Dublin 
Regulation creates “clear imbalances”  
and must be abandoned.
To begin with, the largest stumbling block remains the 
Dublin system	and,	more	specifically,	the	allocation	of	
responsibility for asylum seekers across EU states. Most 
countries agree that the Dublin Regulation 604/2013 
creates “clear imbalances” and must be abandoned.10 
However,	they	disagree	over	the	need	for	a	mandatory	
relocation scheme. On the one hand, Austria and 
Eastern	European	states	continue	to	fervently	oppose	
any mandatory quotas and demand a system that is 
premised	on	‘alternative	forms’	of	solidarity	instead.11 
On the other hand, certain Western and Southern 
European	states	like	Luxembourg,	the	Netherlands	
and	Greece	have	long	insisted	on	an	EU-wide	system	
of mandatory redistributions.12 In a joint letter to the 
Commission in April 2020, Italy, France, Germany 
and	Spain	advocated	for	a	near-mandatory	model	of	
relocations.13 In a non-paper leaked shortly afterwards, 
Spain, Italy, Greece, Malta and Cyprus similarly called 
for	a	“mandatory	system	providing	for	a	fair	and	rapid	
distribution	of	asylum	seekers	arriving	irregularly	to	the	
EU”, based on pre-determined distribution criteria.14
Border procedures are the second point of contention. 
In a non-paper published last autumn, Germany’s 
Interior Ministry called for mandatory initial screenings 
of	asylum	seekers	at	the	EU’s	external	borders.15 Under 
this proposal, asylum seekers with manifestly unfounded 
applications would be denied entry into the EU and 
swiftly returned to third countries. France supported this 
proposal.16	However,	Southern	European	states,	whose	
asylum	systems	are	already	stretched	to	the	limit,	have	
strongly opposed mandatory assessments at the border. 
They	argued	that	this	system	would	be	too	inflexible,	
require considerable staff and resources, and could lead 
to long periods of mass detention.17 
This	position	may	be	shifting,	nevertheless.	The	two	
non-papers from April 2020 indicate that some Southern 
European	states	are	in	favour	of	more	restrictive	asylum	
processes and pre-screenings at the border.18
By contrast, control-oriented policies limiting 
migration	along	the	external	dimension	have	proven	less	
controversial.	The	response	by	European	governments	
and	institutions	to	the	developments	at	the	Greece-
6Turkey	border	has	once	again	displayed	the	collective	
support	for	stronger	external	borders.	Increasing	
returns is a second area of consensus among member 
states.	Leaked	documents	have	made	it	clear	that	a	
strong majority supports using all possible means that 
they support using all possible forms of conditionality, 
such	as	visas,	development	aid	and	trade,	to	secure	
cooperation from third countries, especially in 
readmitting migrants.19	Recent	policy	developments	–	
such	as	the	expansion	of	the	European	Border	and	Coast	
Guard	Agency	(Frontex)	–	and	the	speed	at	which	these	
reforms were agreed on point to a consolidated trend 
towards control-oriented measures.
3.  Watered-down ambitions: What we know 
about the New Pact
Although member states might change their stated 
positions	as	developments	continue	to	unfold,	it	 
appears that so far, consensus can only be found on 
more control-oriented measures and watered-down 
forms	of	solidarity.	Leaked	documents	and	 
media comments indicate that the Commission 
has considered compromising on commitments to 
responsibility-sharing.22  In addition, the new  
European Commission stated its support for strong 
external	borders	and	a	“more	robust	system	of	
readmission and return.”20	Recent	interviews	by	the	
Commissioner for Home Affairs following her tour of 
European	capitals	confirm	the	Commission’s	intention	
to	pay	“much	more	attention	to	effective	returns”	than	
in the past.21 
This control-oriented focus and the possible 
compromise on a minimum degree of responsibility-
sharing raise the questions of if and how the reformed 
CEAS could address current and future challenges 
effectively,	in	compliance	with	EU	values	and	law.	The	
approach that the Commission seemed set to adopt on 
the	three	points	discussed	above	–	the	external	border	
and returns, border procedures and Dublin Regulation 
– is discussed below, while acknowledging that these 
proposals	are	not	final. 
3.1   RETURNS AND BORDER MANAGEMENT 
AT CENTRE STAGE
Firstly,	as	things	stood,	the	Pact	was	set	to	reaffirm	
the	importance	of	the	external	dimension	of	migration	
policy	over	the	internal	dimension.	It	is	still	expected	
to	reflect	member	states’	wide	support	for	greater 
cooperation with third countries on migration 
management.	However,	EU	funding	and	cooperation	
efforts	will	likely	focus	on	limiting	spontaneous	arrivals	
and increasing returns – both of which remain priorities 
of	the	Commission	and	member	states.	Comparatively,	
strengthening safe channels, boosting resettlement 
or	prioritising	development	goals	–	as	international	
organisations	have	called	for	and	the	Commission	had	
initially	committed	to	do	–	find	little	mention	in	working	
documents	and	official	statements.
This	overemphasis	on	strengthening	border	controls	
and increasing returns is misplaced. The EU’s push to 
accelerate returns has, so far, come hand in hand with 
reduced	accountability	and	safeguards	over	how	such	
returns are carried out. This increases the risk of people 
being sent back to dangerous conditions.23
In addition, the growing use of conditionality to 
accelerate returns may harm the Union’s relations with 
third	countries.	These	have	long	been	frustrated	with	
the EU’s approach to cooperation and its imposition of 
a	migration	agenda	over	their	own	priorities,	such	as	
development	projects,	legal	pathways	and	remittances.	
African	diplomats	have	reported	feeling	pressured	and	
undermined by the EU’s use of conditionality.24 As such, 
EU	pressure	in	this	area	may	be	counterproductive	and	is	
likely to undermine its ambition of forging sustainable, 
long-term partnerships. 
The overemphasis on strengthening  
border controls and increasing returns  
is misplaced. 
Conditionality	may	also	compromise	the	effectiveness	
of policies that are made subsidiary to migration 
management,	such	as	development	aid	or	resettlement.	
Efforts	in	these	policy	areas	risk	being	diverted	from	
countries	where	they	are	most	needed	or	most	effective,	
to	those	with	the	highest	migration	relevance.25 For 
example,	development	funds	were	often	redirected	
to key countries of origin or transit under the EU 
Emergency Trust Fund for Africa.26 
3.2   BORDER PROCEDURES
Secondly, following Germany’s recommendation, the 
Commission may propose mandatory screenings 
at the border	to	increase	the	efficiency	of	the	CEAS.	
Although references to the so-called border instrument 
remain	vague,	the	objective	would	be	to	channel	
applicants into fast-track asylum procedures or swift 
return procedures. 
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based on their likelihood of obtaining asylum, an 
accelerated border procedure for all applicants or a 
combination	of	both.	This	first	step	in	the	asylum	
process could be linked to a common list of safe third 
countries. Asylum seekers coming from or transiting 
through countries with low recognition rates would 
be subject to this procedure. In their letter to the 
Commission,	France,	Germany,	Italy	and	Spain	have	also	
called	for	an	extended	catalogue	of	clauses	to	declare	
applications inadmissible.2 
Accelerated procedures increase the 
possibility of applicants being wrongly 
denied asylum.
This border instrument could limit the number of 
arrivals	and	thus	help	secure	wider	participation	
in	relocation	efforts.	To	avoid	increasing	pressures	
on asylum systems and ease Southern European 
states’	concerns,	it	could	be	set	off	only	in	specific	
circumstances.	However,	accelerated	procedures	increase	
the possibility of applicants being wrongly denied 
asylum. Combined with reduced procedural safeguards 
and legal remedies, the border instrument may lead to 
added risks of refoulement.28 This raises the question: 
would such measures be proposed to make the CEAS 
more	efficient,	or	to	allow	national	governments	to	
evade	their	obligations	under	international	law	and	limit	
access to asylum further?
More	concretely,	there	is	no	hard	evidence	that	fast-
track	procedures	increase	efficiency.29 In some cases, 
accelerated procedures may lead to further delays, as 
more decisions are legally challenged and go to appeal. 
Complex	cases	would	still	require	a	thorough	evaluation.	
In	addition,	many	migrants	arrive	without	identity	
documents,	preventing	them	from	being	channelled	
into different procedures.30	In	a	context	where	asylum	
systems	at	the	external	borders	are	understaffed	and	
overburdened,	the	proposed	instrument	might	create	
new bottlenecks instead of a more resilient system.31  
3.3   MANDATORY FLEXIBLE SOLIDARITY
Thirdly, concerning the Dublin Regulation, 
Commission Vice-President Schinas announced in 
February	2020	that	the	Commission’s	proposed	revision	
of the Regulation is no longer on the table.32 This has 
opened questions on the kind of proposals that are 
likely to replace it. Following the German lead, the 
Commission may propose a compromise consisting of 
‘mandatory	flexible	solidarity’.
Schinas has used the metaphor of baskets to describe 
this approach.33	Some	member	states	would	provide	
financial	resources,	thus	filling	one	basket,	while	others	
would	contribute	to	other	baskets,	for	example,	by	
hosting	asylum	seekers.	Alternatively,	member	states	
may	provide	operational	support,	for	instance,	in	border	
control	or	return	operations.	All	states	would	have	to	
contribute in some way – but, crucially, not necessarily 
through mandatory relocations. Responsibility itself 
would	be	a	basket,	and	member	states	would	be	expected	
to	fulfil	their	obligations	to	benefit	from	the	different	
forms	of	‘flexible	solidarity’.
Although concrete details about this approach remain 
unknown, some questions can be raised already. 
Depending	on	the	degree	of	flexibility	on	offer,	the	
Commission may struggle to secure support from 
different states for this basket approach. Eastern 
European states may oppose a scheme that coerces 
them	into	contributing	to	relocations.	This	proved	
controversial	in	the	context	of	the	2015	temporary	
relocation scheme, with which the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland refused to comply. 
The Commission may struggle to secure 
support from different states for the  
basket approach.
Greece	and	other	countries	of	first	entry	may	conversely	
reject	a	voluntary	proposal	due	to	fears	that	voluntary	
relocations would fail to address their needs. These 
concerns	led	Mediterranean	states	to	reject	previous	
attempts	to	morph	relocations	into	‘effective	(flexible)	
solidarity’,	such	as	those	led	by	the	Slovakian	Council	
Presidency in 2016.34
The current humanitarian emergency in Greece 
will	make	these	countries’	case	against	voluntary	
contributions	and	in	favour	of	mandatory	relocations	
stronger.	Despite	the	severity	and	long	duration	of	the	
Greek reception crisis and widespread calls for member 
states to relocate unaccompanied minors, only a few 
states	have,	so	far,	agreed	to	do	so.35
If	the	Commission	decides	to	move	forward	with	a	
mandatory	flexible	solidarity	model,	it	will	have	to	
carefully weigh the preferences of member states  
against	the	need	to	ensure	that	individual	contributions	
make up the necessary total to make the CEAS 
sustainable, both in the short and long run. This 
raises the question of how a basket system, whereby 
states	have	the	freedom	to	choose	how	to	contribute,	
could	address	unforeseeable	rises	in	arrivals	or	
future humanitarian emergencies. A strong safety 
net – states committing to raise their contributions 
quickly	if	arrivals	were	to	increase	drastically	–	would	
be necessary. The possibility of such a safety net is 
currently under discussion.
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operational support as a self-standing ‘solidarity’ option 
is also problematic as a matter of principle. Considering 
contributions towards return operations or border 
management as a form of solidarity requires some 
mental	contortions.	Conversely,	assisting	those	in	need	
of protection in line with member states’ international 
obligations becomes a discretionary choice. This would 
shift the focus of the EU’s asylum and reception system 
away	from	providing	asylum	and	towards	exclusion.
4.  What we need: A more ambitious agenda for 
the future migration policy
After	years	of	legislative	and	political	stagnation,	persistent	
divisions	may	push	the	European	Commission	to	present	a	
New	Pact	that	reflects,	first	and	foremost,	member	states’	
concerns and interests. Seeking a compromise on the 
Dublin system and border procedures while increasing 
returns	may	help	to	break	the	political	deadlock.	However,	
it	raises	concerns	that	the	Commission’s	future	initiatives	
will boil down to the lowest common denominator 
acceptable to member states. This casts doubt on the 
Commission’s	stated	intention	to	deliver	a	migration	and	
asylum	system	which	is	“more	effective”	and,	at	the	same	
time, “more humane”.36   
The Commission should provide strong 
leadership, innovative thinking and bold 
solutions for these uncertain times. 
The humanitarian emergency at the Greek borders and 
the COVID-19 pandemic render the need for long-term 
and sustainable migration and asylum policies more 
apparent	than	ever.	Neither	short-term,	control-oriented	
thinking nor the watered-down compromises that seem 
likely	to	make	up	the	bulk	of	the	New	Pact	will	provide	
an answer to these and future challenges. Instead, 
the	Commission	should	provide	strong	leadership,	
innovative	thinking	and	bold	solutions	for	these	
uncertain times. It should seize this longer window of 
opportunity and the new momentum to put forward an 
ambitious agenda, while also learning the lessons from 
the tumultuous months of early 2020. Member states, 
too, should be open to reconsidering past, entrenched 
positions in the face of new challenges.
RECOMMENDATION 1
 
The	first	lesson	is	the importance of solidarity. The 
need for coordinated responses to emergencies has 
never	been	clearer.	In	Greece,	COVID-19	has	put	the	
pre-existing	humanitarian	emergency	on	fast-forward.	
Voluntary	efforts	to	relocate	vulnerable	unaccompanied	
minors	from	Greece	are	welcome.	Nevertheless,	the	
support offered barely makes a dent on the scale of 
the	challenge.	Seven	weeks	after	the	Commission	
announced	its	initiative	on	relocations	from	Greece	
in early March 2020, only 59 unaccompanied children 
have	been	relocated,	to	Luxembourg	and	Germany,	out	
of initial pledges of 1,600. Nearly 40,000 refugees and 
asylum seekers remain in the Aegean Islands as of mid-
April 2020.37 Relocations from the Greek islands should 
have	taken	place	months,	if	not	years,	earlier. 
The Commission’s priority should be to 
develop structural mechanisms that can 
address and prevent future humanitarian 
emergencies. 
The Commission’s priority at this time should be to 
develop	structural	mechanisms	that	can	address	and	
prevent	future	humanitarian	emergencies,	even	if	
a	few	member	states	find	them	less	appealing.	The	
Commission	cannot	overlook	its	role	in	upholding	the	
principles of international protection and solidarity, as 
enshrined in the EU Treaties.38	A	degree	of	flexibility	in	
responsibility-sharing	could	be	made	to	work.	However,	
it	then	must	provide	several	minimum	guarantees:	
q  Member states’ solidarity contributions must be 
systematic. The CEAS must ensure the prompt 
relocation of all those in need based on predetermined 
allocation	keys.	As	experience	has	shown,	a system 
that relies on voluntary pledges exclusively would 
cause unnecessary delays and would be unable to 
respond to the full scale of the challenges faced by 
countries	of	first	arrival.
q  Awarding flexibility to member states should not 
lead to policy areas being under- or overfunded 
across	the	board.	For	example,	if	states	exclusively	or	
predominantly	direct	their	operational	and	financial	
support to return or border management rather than 
asylum or reception systems, the priority would 
shift further towards control-oriented measures.39 It 
would also disregard the needs of asylum seekers and 
refugees	who	have	already	reached	the	EU.
9q  Solidarity should be enforceable	to	prevent	initial	
commitments from becoming a dead letter, be it 
concerning relocations or contributions in other 
areas.	Lengthy	infringement	procedures	against	
states	that	refuse	to	fulfil	their	initial	pledges	may	
not	provide	enough	redress.	This	was	illustrated	by	
the	ruling	of	the	Court	of	Justice	of	the	European	
Union	(CJEU)	against	Poland,	Hungary	and	the	
Czech Republic for refusing to take part in the 2015 
temporary relocation mechanism. On 2 April 2020, 
the	CJEU	held	that	this	constituted	a	violation	of	 
EU law.40 This ruling has been widely praised. 
However,	it	came	much	too	late	–	almost	five	years	
after the original decision and after the end of the 
relocation mechanism, meaning that its practical 
effects in securing compliance may be limited. 
Against this background, the Commission may need 
to	explore	and	be	open	to	alternative	methods	of	
ensuring compliance.
q  Finally, in line with widespread calls to prioritise 
the relocation of unaccompanied minors and other 
vulnerable	applicants,	the Commission should 
secure priority mandatory relocation quotas for 
persons at high-risk.41 Regardless of the solidarity 
model proposed, unaccompanied minors and other 
vulnerable	migrants	–	for	example,	victims	of	torture	
or migrants with health conditions – should be swiftly 
redistributed across states, with guarantees for their 
adequate reception. 
RECOMMENDATION 2
 
The second lesson learnt is that the New Pact must 
strengthen the right to asylum. Tackling the backlog 
of	asylum	applications	and	improving	the	efficiency	of	
the CEAS is a worthwhile goal of both the Commission 
and	member	states.	However,	due	to	the	lack	of	concrete	
proposals regarding the border procedure, it is unclear 
how	it	could	guarantee	greater	efficiency.	By	contrast,	
the	proposed	border	instrument	could	exacerbate	 
the dangers faced by asylum seekers stuck in border 
areas, and risks compromising the fair assessment of 
asylum claims. 
The proposed border instrument  
could exacerbate the dangers asylum 
seekers face. 
q  The Commission ought to strengthen procedural 
guarantees and not provide member states with 
opportunities to bypass their obligations under 
EU and international law. This entails ensuring that 
adequate safeguards – including the right to appeal, 
the	suspensive	effect	of	these	appeals	and	standards	
to	ensure	appropriate	asylum	interviews	–	apply	to	all	
asylum seekers, regardless of their country of origin 
or transit.
q  In	order	to	address	widespread	concerns	over	
efficiency,	financial resources and operational 
support should be invested in accelerating the 
regular asylum process without undermining 
procedural fairness.
The border instrument is especially concerning in the 
context	of	COVID-19.	In	response	to	the	pandemic,	
several	states	have	suspended	asylum	processes	or	
raised substantial obstacles to accessing protection. This 
renders the Commission’s defence of the right to asylum 
especially urgent. At the same time, the COVID-19 crisis 
has	shone	a	light	on	the	vulnerabilities	of	detained	
migrants: the border procedure may only make this 
worse	by	drastically	expanding	detention.
RECOMMENDATION 3
 
Third, the New Pact must correct the imbalances 
in	the	EU’s	priorities	along	the	external	dimension.	
The Commission and member states both continue 
to	reiterate	their	commitment	to	a	comprehensive	
approach	to	migration.	However,	their	policies reflect 
an overemphasis on returns and migration control 
at the cost of legal pathways and support to refugees 
and displaced people in third countries. 
The New Pact must correct the imbalances 
in the EU’s priorities along the external 
dimension.
q  The short-sighted emphasis on border management 
and returns – and the use of conditionality to 
strengthen them – is harming the EU’s relations 
with third countries. The New Pact should instead 
consolidate the interests the EU shares with its 
neighbours	and	live	up	to	its	rhetoric	of	building	“a	
true	partnership	of	equals”	with	developing	regions.42
q  In practice, this means getting serious about 
increasing resettlement places and establishing 
legal pathways,	while	ensuring	that	development	
aid	is	used	effectively	to	promote	development	–	not	
reduce	arrivals.	
The humanitarian emergency at the Greek borders and 
particularly the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic 
in March 2020 will, in one way or another, be a turning 
point for the Commission’s approach to the New Pact. 
Whereas initial reports suggested that the Commission 
would propose a series of pragmatic compromises 
10
focusing on control-oriented proposals and watered-
down forms of responsibility-sharing, recent 
developments	show	that	they	would	fail	to	rise	to	the	
test. Both the Commission and member states will need 
to	re-evaluate	their	positions.
If	there	ever	was	a	time	for	leadership	and	long-term	
thinking, it is now. European citizens are looking to the 
institutions	for	concrete	initiatives	and	responses	to	
current challenges. With the New Pact, the Commission 
must show political courage and the willingness to take 
the	road	less	travelled.	If,	instead,	it	follows	the	path	set	
by	member	states’	inflexibility,	it	will	have	squandered	
this time.
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